Code-Based Cryptography

Key Attacks

I. Márquez-Corbella

informatiques mathématiques

Code-Based Cryptography

1. Error-Correcting Codes and Cryptography
2. McEliece Cryptosystem
3. Message Attacks (ISD)
4. **Key Attacks**
5. Other Cryptographic Constructions Relying on Coding Theory

4. Key Attacks

1. **Introduction**
2. Support Splitting Algorithm
3. Distinguisher for GRS codes
4. Attack against subcodes of GRS codes
5. Error-Correcting Pairs
6. Attack against GRS codes
7. Attack against Reed-Muller codes
8. Attack against Algebraic Geometry codes
9. Goppa codes still resist

The McEliece Cryptosystem

Consider $\left(\mathcal{F} \right)$ family of codes

The McEliece Cryptosystem



The McEliece Cryptosystem



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

Key Generation Algorithm:

1. $G \in \mathbb{F}_q^{k \times n}$ a **generator matrix** for $\mathcal{C} \in \mathcal{F}$
2. $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{C}}$ an **"Efficient" decoding algorithm** for $\mathcal{C}$ which corrects up to t **errors**.

Public Key: $\mathcal{K}_{\text{pub}} = (G, t)$
Private Key: $\mathcal{K}_{\text{secret}} = (\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{C}})$

The McEliece Cryptosystem



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Parameters	Key size	Security level
$[1024, 524, 101]_2$	67 ko	2^{62}
$[2048, 1608, 48]_2$	412 ko	2^{96}

The McEliece Cryptosystem

Encryption Algorithm:

Encrypt a message $\mathbf{m} \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$ as

$$\textsc{Encrypt}(\mathbf{m}) = \mathbf{m}G + \mathbf{e} = \mathbf{y}$$

where $\mathbf{e}$ is a random error vector of weight at most t.

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Decryption Algorithm:

Using $\mathcal{K}_{secret}$, the receiver obtain $\mathbf{m}$.

$$\textsc{Decrypt}(\mathbf{y}) = \mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{C}}(\mathbf{y}) = \mathbf{m}$$

Which code Family? - GRS codes

Generalized Reed-Solomon codes

H. Niederreiter.

Knapsack-type cryptosystems and algebraic coding theory.
Problems of Control and Information Theory, 15(2):159−166, 1986.

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Attack against this proposal:

V. M. Sidelnikov and S. O. Shestakov.

On the insecurity of cryptosystems based on generalized Reed-Solomon codes.
Discrete Math. Appl., 2:439—444, 1992.

Which code Family? - Subcodes of GRS codes

Subcodes of GRS codes

T. Berger and P. Loidreau.

How to mask the structure of codes for a cryptographic use.
Des. Codes Cryptogr., 35:63−79, 2005.

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Attack against this proposal:

C. Wieschebrink.

Cryptanalysis of the Niederreiter public key scheme based on GRS subcodes.
In Post-Quantum Cryptography, volume 6061 of Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., pages 61−72, 2010.

Which code Family? - Reed-Muller codes

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A public-key cryptosytem based on Reed-Muller codes.
Discrete Math. Appl., 4(3):191 – 207, 1994.

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Attacks against this proposal:

L. Minder and A. Shokrollahi.

Cryptanalysis of the Sidelnikov cryptosystem.
In EUROCRYPT 2007, pages 347 – 360, 2007.

I. V. Chizhov, and M. A. Borodin.

The failure of McEliece PKC based on Reed-Muller codes.
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 287, 2013.

Which code Family? - AG codes

Algebraic Geometry codes

H. Janwa and O. Moreno.

McEliece public crypto system using algebraic-geometric codes.
Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 1996.

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✗ Attacks against this proposal:

C. Faure and L. Minder.

Cryptanalysis of the McEliece cryptosystem over hyperelliptic codes.
Proceedings 11th Int. Workshop on Algebraic and Combinatorial Coding Theory, 2008.

A. Couvreur, I. Márquez-Corbella and R. Pellikaan.

A polynomial time attack against Algebraic Geometry code based Public-Key Cryptosystems.
ISIT 2014, 1446 – 1450, 2014.

Which code Family? - Concatenated codes

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H. Niederreiter.
Knapsack-type cryptosystems and algebraic coding theory.
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Problems of Control and Information Theory, 15(2):159—166, 1986.

Attack against this proposal:

N. Sendrier.
On the concatenated structure of a linear code.
AAECC, 9(3):221—242, 1998

Which code Family? - Convolutional codes

Convolutional codes

C. Löndahl and T. Johansson.
A new version of McEliece PKC based on convolutional codes.
ICICS, 15(2): 461-470, 2012.

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ICICS, 15(2): 461-470, 2012.

Attack against this proposal:

G. Landais and J.P. Tillich

An efficient attack of a McEliece cryptosystem variant based on convolutional codes.
Post-Quantum Cryptography, LNCS, vol. 7932, 102-117, 2013.

Which code Family? - Binary Goppa codes

Binary Goppa codes

R. J. McEliece.

A public-key cryptosystem based on algebraic coding theory.
DSN Progress Report, 42-44:114–116, 1978.

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McEliece scheme with Goppa codes has resisted cryptanalysis so far!


GRS
codes


Goppa
codes
GRS
codes
Alternant
codes


Subcodes
of GRS codes
Goppa
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codes
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
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codes
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
Subcodes
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Goppa
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GRS
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Alternant
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Reed-Muller
codes
Broken
Unbroken
Subcodes of GRS
of small dimension
(Unbroken)


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of small dimension
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New results in
Wild Goppa codes
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