

# Code-Based Cryptography

McEliece Cryptosystem

## 2. McEliece Cryptosystem

1. Formal Definition
2. Security-Reduction Proof
3. McEliece Assumptions
4. Notions of Security
5. Critical Attacks - Semantic Secure Conversions
6. Reducing the Key Size
7. Reducing the Key Size - LDPC codes
8. Reducing the Key Size - MDPC codes
9. **Implementation**

# eBATS: ECRYPT Benchmarking of PK Systems

**eBATS:** ECRYPT Benchmarking  
of Asymmetric Systems



D. J. Bernstein and T. Lange (editors)

eBATS: ECRYPT Benchmarking of Cryptographic Systems.

<http://bench.cr.yp.to>, accessed 7 March 2015.

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Measures PK system:

- Keys size
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- Time of Encrypt
- Time of Decrypt

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# eBATS: ECRYPT Benchmarking of PK Systems

Include 7 PK encryption schemes:

1. McEliece implementation ( $2^{80}$  Security)  
By **B. Biswas** and **N. Sendrier**
2. NTRU implementation ( $2^{256}$  Security)  
By **M. Etzel**
3. Five sizes of RSA (starting with  $2^{80}$  Security)

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**Main Drawback:** Large Key size

But **QC-MDPC** codes allows **compact key representation**

- Provide Public key of 4800 bits for  $2^{80}$  security
- No attacks or implementations are known.



# Recent Results

				cycles/block		
m	t	Public Key Size	Sec.	Encryption(*)	Decryption(*)	Decryption(*) (McBits)
11	40	88440	95	25K	189K	29K
12	50	262200	120	47K	300K	60K

\* Intel Xeon 3.4Ghz, single processor

\* Intel Core 3.4Ghz, 4-core

**AES:** 10-20 cycles/byte

100Kcycles  $\sim$  30 $\mu$ s



D. Bernstein, T. Chou and P. Schwabe

*McBits: Fast Constant-Time Code-Based Cryptography.*  
CHES 2013, LNCS, Vol. 8086, 2013, pp 250-272.



B. Biswas and N. Sendrier

*McEliece Cryptosystem Implementation: Theory and Practice.*  
Post-Quantum Cryptography, LNCS, Vol. 5299, 2008, pp 47-62.

# Software implementation

McEliece scheme has been implemented on several platforms:

## 1. CPU



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*MicroEliece: McEliece for Embedded Devices.*

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A. Shoufan, T. Wink, G. Molter, s. Huss and F. Strentzke.

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## 4. Small Embedded devices (8-bit micro controllers)



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2. Evaluation of Side-Channel attacks
3. Protection against timing attacks
4. Resistance of McEliece against fault injection attacks

# Code-Based Cryptography

1. Error-Correcting Codes and Cryptography
2. McEliece Cryptosystem
3. **Message Attacks (ISD)**
4. Key Attacks
5. Other Cryptographic Constructions Relying on Coding Theory